#10149 NORM Not Tri: XO 1.5 olpc-update on a WP (security enabled) machine

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#10149: XO 1.5 olpc-update on a WP (security enabled) machine
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 Reporter:  reuben        |                 Owner:  cjb          
     Type:  defect        |                Status:  new          
 Priority:  normal        |             Milestone:  Not Triaged  
Component:  not assigned  |               Version:  not specified
 Keywords:                |           Next_action:  never set    
 Verified:  0             |   Deployment_affected:               
Blockedby:                |              Blocking:               
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 I have not tested this but from what I understand looking at the source it
 looks like someone using a secure xo 1.5 could olpc-update to an unsigned
 build without any warning. This would then prevent the end user from being
 able to boot until they have reflashed with a signed image.

 This raises a larger question: Should an olpc-update server be defined or
 should it be an option that deployments define when creating their own
 custom image?

 My concern is smallish deployments that create a custom image, an image
 that includes additional RPMs. Unless the smallish deployment maintains
 and specifies an update server, all customizations would be lost after an
 olpc-update against our update server.

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Ticket URL: <http://dev.laptop.org/ticket/10149>
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