On Thu, Dec 4, 2008 at 19:17, Greg Smith <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:gregsmitholpc@gmail.com" target="_blank">gregsmitholpc@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
I'm copying in Devel and will drop the sugar list on further replies<br>
(hope that's the right netiquette in this case...).</blockquote><div>(note: I'm not on devel, so please keep me CC'd)<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<div> > security) who are the principals?<br>
> what are their goals?<br>
> what attacks concern us?<br>
<br>
</div>GS - In general I don't want any other devices to be able to appear to<br>
be the XO. We can assume that the XS <-> XO is a secure network not<br>
visible to the outside workd (whether that is true in practice is<br>
another story). So I moved the encryption and stringent security<br>
requirements to the optional case where the XO is talking to a non-XS<br>
server.<br><div></div></blockquote><div><br>I'd rather not make that assumption. Some schools may not have a _local_ school server (even dispite our best wishes) or a student may want to access the server from a non-local connection. The XS, IMHO, should support the "road warrior" use case (at least for post-registration)<br>
</div><br></div>-lf<br>