<p>On 05/05/2011 9:58 AM, "Chris Ball" <<a href="mailto:cjb@laptop.org">cjb@laptop.org</a>> wrote:<br>
> There's interest, but it's more complicated than you think. As I<br>
> understand it, customization sticks can be signed and run in secure mode<br>
> because they perform no side-effects outside of /home. However, an RPM<br>
> can have a %post section which lists commands to be run *as root* during<br>
> the installation.<br>
><br>
> So, offering the ability to install RPMs via signed customization stick<br>
> is equivalent to letting anyone run any series of commands as root.<br>
><br>
> There may be ways to mitigate this risk, such as refusing to run any<br>
> %post scripts (some of which are necessary for proper function of<br>
> packages). Working out what the safe set of actions a hostile RPM<br>
> can perform on a system is a research project, as far as I know.</p>
<p>Can we make it so that it only installs signed RPMs? Would that help?</p>
<p>Sridhar</p>