[OLPC Security] Application bundles and delegation
Simson Garfinkel
simsong at acm.org
Sat Feb 10 10:43:25 EST 2007
Hi, Xuan. Let me take a try at answering your questions:
> In "software installation" part,
> 1. >After installation, the per-program permission list is only
> modifiable by the user
> >through a graphical interface.
> This may cause problems when some program trick the user to change
> permission list to access the other programs.
This is certainly possible. The alternative is to not allow users to
change permissions after a program is installed. Do you think that
this would be a better approach?
> 2. >As a final note, programs cryptographically signed by OLPC or the
> > individual countries may bypass the permission request limits,
> and request
> > any permissions they wish at installation time.
> This guarantees too much power and responsibility to OLPC which I
> find unnecessary. The other programs just have their own rights to
> announce the access limits to their own files, which means all the
> programs are all fair, and when one program use another program, it
> needs permission, just like the real user use the programs. The
> user may have the right of execute all files, but some programs
> which are not supposed to be executed directly by the user can just
> put a "non-executable by John" sign to itself.
I'm sorry; I do not understand the problem here. Could you give a
specific example?
>
> Another thing in the spec, the "first boot" part.
> 1. The identity information is centralized, and the server may
> cause insecurity, as there are always some ways to hack into it.
Yes, but what is the alternative?
> 2. With only the photo, SN and id, how can we find the thief or
> dis function the machine after the a boy lost his laptop, who
> possibly has no idea whom to report to except telling his own
> friends?
The students who have the laptop are students, so they have teachers.
They need the laptop for school. They report the theft to their school.
>
> How about this? At the first time, the child input his name. Then
> every time the laptop is turned on ever since, it automatically use
> the real name to log into the p2p net as long as there's another
> laptop in a range of, say, 1km. In this net, everyone else can see
> who's online, even if no one's in the Internet. Then the thief
> takes risks everywhere as long as there might be someone else using
> XO in this range, because that one may know the name that logged
> in, and may know that he has lost his XO.
The goal of the anti-theft system is not to recover laptops. The goal
is to disable stolen laptops to act as a deterrent.
>
> I always believe in the power of people, especially lots of people
> who know each other. Also, I don't like the idea of supervisor of
> supervisor of supervisor, and so on. Instead, I'd like to be a
> supervisor and a supervised at the same time, fairly.
I believe in the power of the people as well, but as the father of
two five year olds' and a ten year old, I also realize the limits of
this power.
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